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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant Dan Trease ("beaM*' I lili il hr |>ntitinn Im re, HM/1

I lllllit final ordei

of the Department of Environmental Quality's Solid and Hazardous Waste Control
Board ("Board") after a formal adjudicative proceeding. "I his l o u d has junsdiLin. -i
over Hi- potilh'i' I \ - "" -

' " "hi"

,.,!( A,- , § 63-46b-16 (1991) and § 78 2a

3(2)(a) (Supp. 1994).
ISSUES PRESENTED/STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the Executive Secretary of the Department of Environmental

Quality, Division of Environmental Response and Remediation ("DbRR

or

"Division") abuse hr", tiis* imion iii ilfU'iiiiiniini I I M I iiinii'i Ihe Utah Administrative
Code R311-210-3 (d), Trease's failure to contest the Notice of Violation and Order
within 30 days waved his right to administrative contest, reuinsirloMiion i* i/it, v or
judicial appi

- yiew is abuse of discretion. A decision to grant

or deny a Rule 60 1 motion should not be reversed absent abuse of discretion

See

Fackrell v. Fackrell. , 4 ' I ' . ' - l I JI T'"" ( I ', ' I "I.ili I ( ^ ' , |, Lurbctt i/. t itzgeruld. 709
P.2d 384, 3 8 6 (Utah 1985);
2.

Did the Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board abuse its dis it?liun

iii ii(.litj|fliiH tlir F -f " h i , , , Sec ii i .ii y's denial of Trease's Rule 60 Motion to Set
Aside Order? The standard of review is abuse of discretion. A decision to grant or
deny a Rule 60 motion should not be reversed rtb;t nt » Iniso nil (iisciiilinii

;iVe

Fackiell v. Fackrell. 740 P.2d 1 3 1 8 , 1 3 2 0 (Utah 1987); Corbett v. Fitzgerald. 709

1.

Utah R. C

Rules 60 (b)(7).

P.2d 3 8 4 , 3 8 6 (Utah 1985).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-401 et seq., Utah Underground Storage
Tank Act.

2.

Utah Admin. Code, Rule R311-210 et seq.. Administrative Procedures
for Underground Storage Tank Act Adjudicative Proceedings.

(Attached as Addendum A).
3.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 (b). (Attached as Addendum B).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

This case arises under the Utah Underground Storage Tank Act ("Act"),
Utah Code Annotated ("UCA") section 1 9 - 6 - 4 0 1 , £t sm and the Utah Admin. Code
("UAC"), R 3 1 1 - 2 1 0 , et seq.. ("Rules")

Administrative Procedures for Underground

Storage Tank Act Adjudicative Proceedings. It involves the Executive Secretary's
determination that Trease waved his right to administrative contest,
reconsideration, review or judicial appeal by failing to contest the Notice of
Violation and Order ("Notice and Order") within 30 days after the date issued as
required under UAC R311-210-3 (d).
In accordance w i t h Utah Admin. Code R311-210-3 (d), all initial Orders or
Notices of Violation are effective upon issuance and become final if they are not
contested within 30 days of the date issued. Thus, the party waves any right to
2

administrative or judicial reviev\

The contesting party has the burden of proving

that tf le Notice and Order was
311-210-3 Id).
A party may seek to have the Executive Secretary set aside an inn
and Uuk-jr b,," h Ik.i ,iii.{ ll

^oroiinu

\ iinilinr.'l in the Utal i Rules ut Civil Procedure,

Rule 6 0 . If suet\ a motion to set aside is denied, the party may seek
reconsideration K the agency or Boaid ol M M I ik'i.r mn i null,

lll(.iil) Ailnnn i uilr H

3 1 1 n i r . 1 |.
B.
[

Course of the Proceedings and Statement of Facts.
-

:

ICK Tank (UST)

facilities, numerous USTs and also delivers petroleum to his facilities and USTs.
Record " ' n "v

1

85-186.

DERR has been working w i

I

smut; i vo\~.

o n v/uiio *1, i j 9 i , u.d Executive

Secretary sent a certified letter to Trease that resembled numerous other letters
designed to assist Trease lh j t k m

. ( •np'M'ir.t1 . u 1 Ik1

}vdii

l

|| 1111

(

|h

c kit* i

asked Trease to submit petroleum delivery and inventory records to DERR within 1 5
days. Id. Like most of the other letters, the last paragraph
i,

Li< i .1

(|

i-iR'sl

he letter states

I

in , iilertsr uinkiPt [name of a DERR employee] at 5 3 6 - 4 1 0 0 . "

M . In October, 1 9 9 3 , William (Bill) Moore was the DERR employee designated to
work with Trease to assist him '
problems at his facilities, w i t h his USTs and w i t h his petroleum deliveries. R. 0 4 1 ,
Mi

Moore met with, spoke to and otherwise communicated w i t h Trease many

3

times regarding the facility concerned in this matter ("Hooper facility") and Trease's
other facilities. R. 0 4 1 , 1 6 1 .
On February 6, 1 9 9 5 , a Notice and Order was filed by the Executive
Secretary, In the Matter of Dan Trease, 5 6 0 0 South 5 9 0 0 West, Hooper, Utah, Re:
Facility ID No. 1 2 0 0 2 4 1 .

R. 0 0 5 . The Notice and Order alleges that Trease had

made 69 petroleum deliveries to the Hooper facility, which he owns and which was
not in compliance, i d . This is a violation of

§ 19-6-416 (1) of the Act because

Trease had never obtained a certificate of compliance for the facility as required. idand Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-412 (1) (b).

The Notice and Order which assesses a

$ 2 9 , 5 0 0 penalty, was attached to a certified letter to Trease informing him that the
Notice and Order was enclosed. R. 149. The last paragraph of the letter states "If
you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact William Moore at 5364121."Id.
In accordance w i t h Utah Code Ann § 19-6-404(3) and Utah Administrative
Code, R 3 1 1 - 2 1 0 - 4 , Trease had 30 days to file a written request for agency action
contesting the Notice and Order. This fact was stated on the last page of the
Notice and Order as follows:
Order
In accordance w i t h Utah Code Ann. §19-6-416(2) the
Executive Secretary hereby assesses you a penalty of t w e n t y nine
thousand five hundred dollars ( $ 2 9 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 ) , for 59 of the 69
violations set forth in paragraph 13 above, and Orders you to submit
the penalty within 30 days.
Pursuant to 19-6-404(3), you may contest this Notice of
Violation and Order by filing a written request for Agency Action to
4

contest the Notice of Violation for it within 30 days after issuance.
The Request for Agency Action should be filed with.... If you do not
contest this Notice of Violation and Order as described above, the
facts specified herein will be deemed true and not subject to contest in
future administrative or judicial proceedings, and you will forfeit any
right to proceed with an administrative or judicial appeal.
The Executive Secretary intends to seek the maximum civil
penalties for each of the other violations stated above.
R. 003.
Trease did not file a written response within 30 days. At some time after
the Notice and Order was issued, Trease contacted Bill Moore and scheduled a
meeting to discuss compliance issues at all of Trease's facilities. R. 040. The
meeting was set for March 10, 1995 but Trease canceled the meeting and
rescheduled, id- On March 22, 1995, Trease and Moore met and discussed the
compliance violations at all of the Trease facilities. R. 039. Trease did not mention
the February 6, 1995 Notice and Order to Moore nor indicate either directly or
indirectly that the meeting was intended to contest the Notice and Order, id.
On March 6, 1995, as specified in Utah Admin. Code R311-210-3(d) and
stated in the Order, the Order became final 30 days after it was issued. R. 003.
On April 6, 1995 DERR received Trease's Response to Notice Of Violations and
Order. R. 009. In a letter dated April 2 1 , 1995, the Executive Secretary informed
Trease that the Order had already become final and suggested that he could file a
Motion to Set Aside the Order in accordance with Utah Admin. Code R311-210-3
(e). R. 0 1 1 .

5

On May 9, 1995, Trease filed a Motion to set Aside Order and Memorandum
of Authorities in Support of Motion to Set Aside Order. R. 0 3 5 . The basis for this
Motion was Trease's claim that his failure to respond was excusable neglect and
that he had a meritorious defense in that he had relied upon statements of DERR
employees in continuing to deliver petroleum to the facility although he did not have
the statutorily required certificate of compliance. R.035. The Executive Secretary
denied the Motion to Set Aside on November 2 0 , 1 9 9 5 . R. 0 5 3 . The Order
denying the Motion found that Trease's failure to timely contest the Order was not
due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect as required under Utah
R. Civ. P., Rule 60 (b)(1) and that his claims of equitable estoppel had not
presented a meritorious defense against the order as required under R. 60 (b)(1). R.
053.
On December 15, 1995 Trease appealed the decision of the Executive
Secretary to the Board under the provisions of R311-210-3(e)(2) which states "the
party may seek reconsideration or agency review of only that decision to deny such
motion to set aside the order or notice." R. 0 6 6 . In his Memorandum in Support of
the Motion for Agency Review, Trease argued that the Executive Secretary abused
his discretion in denying the Motion to Set Aside and further asserted that his
claims of equitable estoppel had presented a meritorious defense. R. 0 6 6 .
The Division filed a Motion to Dismiss on March 2 8 , 1 9 9 6 . R. 167.

The

Memorandum in Support of the Motion asserted that the Executive Secretary's
denial of the Motion to Set Aside was not arbitrary, capricious or not based on
6

adequate findings of fact or on the law. R. 163. Trease responded to the
Division's Motion to Dismiss on April 15, 1996, asserting that the Executive
Secretary's denial was an abuse of discretion. R. 174. He alleged that the
Executive Secretary had expressed a dislike for Trease and that the Division had not
followed the provisions of "R3-11-2102 (f)(sic)" by not providing a copy of the
Notice and Order to counsel for Trease. R. 171-172. Utah Admin. Code R311210-2 (f) states that "[wjhenever a party is known to be represented by an
attorney...service...shall be made upon the attorney... A party is known to be
represented by an attorney at the time the attorney files a notice of appearance of
counsel, request for agency action, or any other paper which the attorney signs on
behalf of a party." The Division asserted that current counsel for Trease had
specifically stated that he did not represent Respondent in this matter. R. 183184.
The Board met on May 9, 1996, to consider Trease's Motion for Agency
Review of Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Notice and Order and the Division's
Motion to Dismiss, denied Trease's Motion for Agency Review of Order Denying
Motion to Set Aside Notice and Order and affirmed the Executive Secretary's Order
dated November 20, 1995. R. 196-198. The Board granted the Division's Motion
to Dismiss thus dismissing Trease's Motion for Agency Review and his Response to
the Notice and Order filed April 6, 1995. R. 200. Finally the Board found that the
Notice and Order is final and enforceable. R. 200.

7

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Trease does not dispute the fact that if he wished to challenge the Notice
and Order, under the Act and the Rules he was required to request agency action,
in writing, within 30 days of issuance of the Notice and Order. The primary issue
before this Court is whether the Executive Secretary abused his discretion in
denying Trease's Motion to Set Aside Order after Trease defaulted, and whether
the Board abused its discretion in upholding the denial of Trease's Motion by the
Executive Secretary. A decision which constitutes abuse of discretion must be
proven by the appellant to be arbitrary, capricious, or not based on adequate
findings of fact or on the law. Pacer Sport Cycle, Inc. v. Myers. 5 3 4 P.2d 61 6,
617 (Utah 1 975).

Trease has not shown that denial of the Motion to Set Aside

exceeds the limits of reasonability.

The facts of the case demonstrate that the

Executive Secretary's and the Board's decision were carefully thought out, well
reasoned and firmly based in fact and law.
Trease's claim that he was denied his chance to present a defense is belied
by his o w n Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside in which he actually
does present his defense. Further that defense was carefully considered at length
by the Executive Secretary as demonstrated in the Order Denying Motion to Set
Aside. Finally, Trease claims that the letter accompanying the Notice and Order
somehow caused the Order and instructions on how to contact the agency and
request agency review to become "vague." This is meaningless and not a basis for
overturning the decision of the Executive Secretary of the Board.
8

ARGUMENT
I.

TREASE HAS NOT MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS
CLAIM THAT DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE WAS AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION
The burden of marshaling the evidence and submitting it to the Appellate

Court is the same in formal administrative hearings as in civil cases.

"[Appellant]

bears the burden of marshaling all of the evidence supporting the findings and then,
despite the supporting facts, showing that the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence." Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 8 5 8 P.2d
1 3 8 1 , 1385 (Utah 1993).
Our insistence on compliance w i t h the marshaling requirement is not a
case of exalting hypertechnical adherence to form over substance. "A
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined w i t h
pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository
in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research."
State v. Larsen. 8 2 8 P.2d 4 8 7 , 4 9 1 (Utah App. 1992) (affirmed
(Ut. 1993))(citations omitted).

8 6 5 P.2d 1355

The party challenging the administrative agency's findings of fact must
marshall all of the evidence in support of the agency findings and then demonstrate
that the challenged findings are unsupported by substantial evidence. Steele v. Bd.
of Rev, of Indus. Com'n. 845 P.2d 9 6 0 , 9 6 2 (Utah App. 1993), citing Stewart v.
Board of Review. 831 P.2d 134, 137-38 (Utah App. 1992).
Trease only argues selected evidence which is favorable to his position
without presenting any evidence supporting the agency's findings. "It is the
petitioner's duty to properly present the record, by marshaling all of the evidence
9

supporting the findings and showing that, despite that evidence and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn therefrom, the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence." Dept. of Air Force v. Swider. 8 2 4 P.2d 4 4 8 , 4 5 1 (Utah
App. 1991), citing Grace Drilling Co. . Board of Review. 7 7 6 P.2d 6 3 , 67 (Utah
App. 1989); see also, Heinecke v. Dept. of Commerce. 8 1 0 P.2d 4 5 9 , 4 6 4 (Utah
App. 1991); Sampson v. Richins. 7 7 0 P.2d 9 9 8 , 1002 (Utah App.), cert,

denied,

776 P.2d 9 1 6 (Utah 1989).
Trease has not met the burden of marshaling the evidence in support of the
administrative agency's findings or showing how those finding are not supported by
substantial evidence. Therefore, thus Court should affirm the findings of the
Agency.
II.

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY'S DENIAL OF TREASE'S MOTION TO SET
ASIDE THE DEFAULT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
The standard of review that the Court must employ in determining whether

the denial of the motion to set aside the default is whether the denial was an abuse
of the Executive Secretary's discretion. A decision to grant or deny a Utah R. Civ.
P. Rule 60 motion should not be reversed absent abuse of discretion. See Fackrell
v. Fackrell. 7 4 0 P.2d 1 3 1 8 , 1320 (Utah 1987); Corbett v. Fitzgerald. 7 0 9 P.2d
3 8 4 , 3 8 6 (Utah 1985); Larsen v. Collin. 6 8 4 P. 2d 5 2 , 54 (Utah 1984); Birch v.
Birch. 771 P.2d 1 1 1 4 , 1117 (Utah App. 1989): Baker v. Western Surety Co.. 7 5 7
P.2d 8 7 8 , 881 (Utah App. 1988). In Pacer Sport Cycle. Inc. v. Myers, the Utah
Supreme Court held that a court "should not reverse [a decision granting or denying

10

a Rule 60(b) motion] except for abuse of discretion, to w i t , that it is arbitrary,
capricious, or not based on adequate findings of fact or on the l a w / ' Pacer, 5 3 4
P.2d 6 1 6 , 617 (Utah 1975).

Unless this Court finds that the Executive

Secretary's decision is arbitrary, capricious, or not based on adequate findings of
fact or on the law, it must uphold the decision of the Executive Secretary.
Trease claims that his conduct was a reasonable mistake and that the default
should have been set aside because "he merely responded in the incorrect manner
by scheduling a meeting." Appellant's Brief at 7. However, the Notice and Order
sent to Trease did not state that he should set up a meeting, nor did the attached
letter suggest that a meeting would waive the requirements specifically set out in
the Order. R. 0 0 2 . As w i t h the many similar letters previously sent to Trease, the
attached letter suggested that if Trease had any questions he should call a DERR
employee. R. 0 0 1 , 149. On the other hand, the Order clearly, specifically and in
detail stated that, in accordance w i t h the applicable statutes, the respondent must
respond in writing within 30 days, or the Notice and Order would be deemed to be
true and all rights to contest the matter would be forfeited. R. 0 0 2 . Neither the
letter nor the attached Notice and Order provided any reason for Trease to assume
that setting up a meeting would waive the need to reply. The Order was very
specific in putting Trease on notice that he was required to reply in writing to a
specific address. Further, since he had received other letters similar to the attached
letter, he should have been able to differentiate the Notice and Order from the
letter.
11

Trease presents himself as an innocent citizen unaware of the administrative
system or judicial system who made an excusable mistake. This pose is fallacious
in light of the facts. Appellant has had lengthy experience in the administrative
forum. Trease owns and/or operates several UST facilities, numerous USTs and
also delivers petroleum. R. 185-186. DERR employees have been working w i t h
Trease in an attempt to bring his facilities into compliance since 1 9 9 0 . i d . Over
that time Trease has repeatedly attempted to avoid compliance, has ignored the
Act, has refused to follow specific requests and orders and has demonstrated his
unwillingness to comply w i t h applicable laws and rules. R. 0 7 3 , 162, 175, 178,
185. Trease has previously defaulted in administrative cases and had a District
Court Judgment issued against him in a case in which he defaulted.

2

his certificates of compliance revoked by default at several stations.

He has had
3

id.

Despite the revocations, Trease has continued to deliver petroleum to the facilities,

id.
2.

On December 4, 1 9 9 1 , a Judgment and Order was issued against Trease in Second District
Court case No. 9 1 0 9 0 2 8 9 2 . A default judgment had been entered against Trease in this
matter when he failed to respond to a Notice of Violation and Order.

3.

Notice of Non-compliance, Facility # 3 0 0 0 1 8 8 , issued February 3, 1 9 9 2 ;
Notice of Intent to Revoke Certificate of Compliance, Facility ID # 3 0 0 0 1 8 8 , issued October
28, 1992;
Order Revoking Certificate of Compliance, Facility ID # 3 0 0 0 1 8 8 , November 3 0 , 1994.
Notice of Intent to Revoke Certificate of Compliance, Facility ID # 0 1 0 0 3 1 9 , issued August
25, 1 9 9 3 .
Notice of Intent to Revoke Certificate of Compliance, Facility ID # 1 2 0 0 2 4 0 , issued January
5, 1995.
Notice of Intent to Revoke Certificate of Compliance, Facility ID # 1 2 0 0 3 3 1 , issued January
3 1 , 1995.

12

Trease claims that he was "under the mistaken impression that contacting a
representative of the DERR would satisfy the requirement of responding to the
Notice of Violations and Order within 30 days." Appellant's brief at 6. This claim
ignores several relevant facts: (1) the notice states that a written request for
hearing is necessary and also provides the address at which to respond (R.003); (2)
Trease had previously been defaulted in other cases for failing to respond (R. 185);
(3) Trease had met w i t h Moore on numerous previous occasions to discuss
compliance (R. 041); (4) the meeting w i t h Moore was not held until after the
written response was due ( R. 40); (4) if Trease thought that "contacting a
representative of the DERR would satisfy the requirements of responding to Notice
of Violations and Order within 30 days," this means that he was aware of the
requirement (Appellant's brief at 6); and finally (5) Trease did not discuss the
Notice and Order w i t h Moore or tell him that he had scheduled the meeting in lieu
of a written response in either of his calls to Moore or during the March 2 2 . 1 995
meeting. R. 0 3 9 - 4 0 .
Trease also claims that his neglect is excusable since he did not have the
advice of an attorney. 4 Appellant's Brief at 7. However, Utah courts have often
held that the fact that a party is acting without counsel is not a ground for
excusable neglect. See Fackrell v. Fackrell. 7 4 0 P.2d 1 3 1 8 , 1320 (Utah 1987), *L
P. W. Enterprises, lpg r yT |Mwf, 6 0 4 P.2d 4 8 6 (Utah 1979), Kanzee v. Kanzee. 6 6 8

4.

Actually he had several attorneys; he simply chose not to consult them. R. 183184.
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P.2d 4 9 5 , 4 9 7 (Utah 1983) and Larsen v. Collin. 6 8 4 P.2d 52, 54-55 (Utah 1984).
Trease's failure to respond to the Notice and Order is not an isolated, excusable
mistake. Trease has displayed a pattern of conduct that demonstrates his complete
destain for any form of regulation and his desire to flout the statutes and rules. R.
0 7 3 , 162, 175, 178, Transcript at 9, 14, 15.
The Executive Secretary was not arbitrary or capricious in his decision to
deny Trease's claims of reasonable mistake or excusable neglect. R. 0 3 4 - 0 5 3 . He
carefully and thoroughly reviewed all of the issues presented by Trease. The
Secretary cited Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 7 3 3 P.2d 1 3 0 ,
132 (Utah 1987) as stating that "excusable neglect" is defined as "the exercise of
'due diligence'

by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstance."

R.

050.
As stated above, Trease claimed that it was his belief that meeting w i t h
Moore would toll his need to respond to the Notice and Order. However, the
Executive Secretary, in responding to Trease's claim, outlined the various factors
he reviewed in reaching his determination that Trease's claims did not meet the
Mini Spas standard: (1) Trease's claim that he thought his contact w i t h Moore
would toll the time period implies that Trease was aware of the deadline; (2) the
Notice and Order was clear and unambiguous in setting out the deadline while the
reference to Moore in the Secretary's letter was a general statement; (3) there is
no claim or proof that the call to Moore was made before the deadline;

(4) at the

March meeting w i t h Moore, Trease did not mention the Notice and Order or imply
14

that the meeting was intended to contest the Notice and Order. R. 0 4 9 . Based
upon these factors the Secretary held that Trease's actions did not demonstrate the
exercise of due diligence by a reasonably prudent person. Thus, the Executive
Secretary's decision did not constitute "abuse of discretion" but was firmly based
in sound reasoning.
The Executive Secretary's denial of the Motion to Set Aside was not
arbitrary, capricious or not based on adequate findings of fact or on the law. Nor
was the Board's upholding of the decision of the Executive Secretary an abuse of
discretion. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that a "trial court is endowed with
considerable latitude of discretion in granting or denying a motion to relieve a party
from a final judgment under Rule 60 (b)(1), U.R.C.P., and this court will reverse the
trial court only where an abuse of discretion is clearly established." Airkem
Intermountain. Inc. v. Parker. 513 P.2d 4 2 9 , 431 (Utah 1973) (emphasis added).
In the Airkem case defense counsel filed a notice of withdrawal the day of the trial
and neither counsel nor the defendant appeared. The trial proceeded without them
and the Court found in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant filed a motion to
vacate alleging that his failure to appear was excusable neglect because he worked
from 7:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m, and his counsel had been unable to contact him.
Further, counsel had been unable to contact the defendant's wife at home because
she was in the hospital, terminally ill with cancer. The trial court denied the motion
to vacate. The Supreme Court, in upholding the decision of the lower court, held
that:
15

[T]he requirements of public policy demand more than a
mere statement that a person did not have his day in court
when full opportunity for a fair hearing was afforded to him
or his legal representative. The movant must show that
he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from
appearing by circumstance over which he had no control.
id- (Emphasis by the court).
In the Airkem case the defendant knew that a trial would most likely be set
in the fall and that he worked irregular hours, yet he failed to contact his counsel
for several months. Airkem at 4 3 1 . Because of these facts, the court held that he
had not shown due diligence and that his conduct was not excusable neglect. Id,.
The Court upheld the lower court's denial of relief from the final judgment. M-

In

the case at hand, Trease had clear notice and prior knowledge of the process yet he
still chose to ignore the Notice and Order. He showed no diligence whatsoever and
his request that this Court reverse the decision of the Executive Secretary and the
Board should be denied.
III.

THE MERITS OF TREASE'S CASE WERE CONSIDERED AND WERE FOUND
TO NOT SATISFY UTAH'S MERITORIOUS DEFENSE REQUIREMENT FOR
SETTING ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 60(b)(1).
Prior to issuing the Order denying the Motion to Set Aside Order, the

Executive Secretary looked carefully at the defenses presented by Trease. R. 0 4 3 0 5 3 . Trease claims that it is "harsh and unreasonable punishment" that he should
have to pay penalties "without having the merits of the case considered."
Appellant's Brief at 7. However, Trease submitted a lengthy Memorandum and
several affidavits which were considered by the Executive Secretary in reaching his
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decision. R. 0 1 2 - 3 3 . In fact the greater half of the Executive Secretary's Order
was dedicated to discussing Trease's defenses. R. 0 4 4 - 0 4 8 . The Executive
Secretary's denial of the Motion to Set Aside was not an ill-advised or quickly made
decision; rather, the Executive Secretary carefully considered all of the aspects of
Trease's defense in reaching his decision. See, Order Denying Motion to Set Aside
and attached affidavits, R. 0 3 6 - 0 5 3 .
Trease's "meritorious defense" is his claim that he "reasonably relied" on
statements allegedly made by a DERR employee, Shelly Quick, in continuing to
deliver petroleum when he had no certificate of compliance. R. 0 2 8 . However, in
his Order the Executive Secretary noted that (1) a letter from the Executive
Secretary had informed Trease that he was not to receive fuel at that facility (R.
047); (2) an affidavit from Ms. Quick refuted Trease's claims concerning her alleged
statements (id-); (3) even if Ms. Quick had made the statements, her statements
would not supersede the Order of the Executive Secretary or the Act

(R. 0 4 6 -

047); and (4) Trease's claims did not meet the elements necessary to invoke
equitable estoppel.

R. 0 4 7 .

Trease actually did have his chance to present his defense, but even if he

5.
"The equitable doctrine of estoppel had three factual predicates: '(1) an admission,
statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterward asserted, (2) action by the other party on
the faith of such admission, statement, or act, and (3) injury to such other party resulting from
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement, or act.'"
Consolidation Coal Co. . Div. of State Lands. 886 P.2d 514, 522 (Utah 1994) (quoting Celebrity
Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission. 602 P.2d 689,694 (Utah 1979)). R. 046.
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had not, the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 60 (b) which must still be met
have not been met by Trease. Trease claims that the purpose of Rule 60 is to
further justice by allowing a party who has made a mistake to have his case
decided on the merits.

Appellant's Brief at 7.

However, according to Miller v.

Brocksmith. 825 P.2d 6 9 0 (Utah App. 1992), this is not an accurate statement of
the rules. The Miller court found that:
"the factors to be considered [in determining whether to set aside a
default judgment] include whether [Trease's] failure constitutes
excusable neglect and whether [Trease] has present a meritorious
defense to the action. ... the question of a meritorious defense arises
only if excusable neglect has been shown."
(Citations Omitted, emphasis added), i d . at 6 9 3 . State By & Through Dept. of Soc.
Serv. v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053. 1056 (Utah 1983)
Trease has not demonstrated excusable neglect and therefore whether or not
he has a meritorious defense is not an issue. Further, his claim that it is an
injustice that he must pay penalties if his Motion to Set Aside is denied is not an
issue. In the Miller case a mother lost custody of her child based upon a default
judgment. The mother claimed that she had contacted an attorney, relied upon his
assurances that her rights were being protected and claimed that her reliance
constituted excusable neglect. However, as in the case at hand, the only evidence
to support the defaulted parties' claim was the defaulted parties' o w n hearsay
testimony. Trease claims that he believed that scheduling a meeting w i t h Moore
tolled the deadline on answering the order. However, there is no evidence to
support this claim, the meeting was not held before the answer was due, and
18

Moore has sworn that Trease did not discuss a response to the Notice and Order at
the meeting. R. 0 4 1 . As in the Miller case, "[h]aving found no excusable neglect,
it is not necessary to determine whether [Trease] had a meritorious defense to [the
notice and o r d e r ] / ' Miller at 6 9 4 . See also State By & Through Dept. of Soc. Serv.
v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1 0 5 3 , 1056 (Utah 1983).

IV.

THE NOTICE AND ORDER PROVIDED TREASE WITH UNAMBIGUOUS
NOTIFICATION OF THE FACT THAT THE ORDER WOULD BECOME FINAL IF
HE DID NOT RESPOND.
The Notice and Order is unmistakable. It sets forth factual findings of sixty-

nine (69) incidents of unlawful activities committed by Dan Trease and orders him
to pay the resulting statutory penalty of $ 2 9 , 5 0 0 for fifty-nine (59) of those
illegalities. R.005-003. The clear and explicit language of the Order informed
Trease that, "[p]ursuant to § 19-6-404(3), you may contest this Notice of Violation
and Order ... ." R.003. In addition to the Notice and Order, there was an
accompanying letter informing Trease that "[i]f you have any questions regarding
this matter, please contact William Moore at (801) 5 3 6 - 4 1 2 1 . "

R.006.

Trease claims his procedural due process rights were violated because of an
alleged contradiction of instructions between the section of the Notice and Order
notifying him of his statutory right to challenge the Order and the accompanying
letter informing him that all questions should be referred to Mr. Moore. Appellant's
Brief at 10, 1 1 .

The "contradiction" which Trease asserts presumably means that

the language of the Order and its accompanying letter were vague.
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"Vagueness

questions are essentially procedural due process issues, i.e., whether the statute
adequately notices the proscribed conduct." See e.g. State v. Hall. 905 P.2d 8 9 9 ,
901 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183, 191-92 (Utah
1987)). However, "a statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it is sufficiently
explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited." J i . (quoting
State v. Theobald. 645 P.2d 50, 51 (Utah 1982)). Although statutory language is
not involved in this matter, those constitutional principles are equally applicable to
this issue and, accordingly, no vagueness exists from the Notice and Order or its
accompanying letter.
The Notice and Order details which of Trease's activities were found to be
illegal (Findings of Fact, R.005), which particular sections of Utah law found those
activities to be improper (Violations, R.004), and the total amount of fines which he
is ordered to pay (Order, R.003). Thus, the Notice and Order explicitly and
sufficiently informed Trease of what conduct was prohibited and the resulting
consequences. See, State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183, 191-92 (Utah 1987) ("In
State v. Theobald, we held that '[a] statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it is
sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited.'")
(citations omitted). This is true whether the reader of the Notice and Order is a
layman or a lawyer.
Trease misstates the intent of the letter accompanying the Notice and Order
calling it a "letter of instructions." Appellants' Brief, p. 1 0 - 1 1 . The letter does not
directly or indirectly "instruct" Trease. The letter simply informs Trease that a
20

Notice and Order has been issued against him and if he has questions he may call
William Moore. R. 149. Similarly, the Order section of the Notice and Order simply
notifies Trease of his right under Utah law to challenge the Order. There are no
contradictory or confusing "instructions" in the Order and the accompanying letter,
but simply unmistakable information concerning Trease's rights.

CONCLUSION
Respondent has not met the burden of proving that the Secretary or the
Board abused their discretion. A decision that constitutes "abuse of discretion" is
one that is "arbitrary, capricious, or not based on adequate findings of fact or on
the law." Pacer Sport and Cvcle. Inc. v. Myers, 5 3 4 P.2d 6 1 6 , 617 (Utah 1 975).
The Utah Supreme Court has further defined "abuse of discretion" as a decision
that "exceeds the limits of reasonability. " See Neztsosie v. Meyer, 883 P.2d 9 2 0 ,
922 (Utah 1994), Crossland Sav. v. Hatch. 877 P.2d 1 2 4 1 , 1243 (Utah 1994),
State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993).
Despite all of his protestations to the contrary, the only reason for Trease's
failure to answer the Notice and Order is his o w n negligence. In accordance w i t h
the applicable rules, of which Trease was on notice, his failure to answer within the
mandated deadline led to an automatic default. The Executive Secretary's denial of
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside and the Board's decision to uphold that Order is
well founded, based upon the evidence, facts and circumstance of the case, and
well documented. The denial is well within the "limits of reasonability." In fact, it
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is the most reasonable decision which could be reached.
Respectfully Submitted this

p\

day of March, 1997

JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

I; M. HObb^ll
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A

R311-208-6

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

(C) The history of compliance or noncompliance;
and
CD) Other unique factors.
(3) Environmental sensitivity. The actual impact
of the violation^) that occurred.
(4) The number of days of noncompliance.
(5) Inability to pay. The final computed penalty
may be adjusted based on a person's inability to pay.
This should be distinguishedfroma persons unwillingness to pay. In cases offinancialhardship, the
Executive Secretary may accept payment of the
penalty under an installment plan, delayed payment
schedule, in-kind mitigation activity or reduced penalty.
(6) Response and investigation costs incurred by
the State and others.
(7) The possible deterrent effect of a penalty to
prevent future violations.
(b) All cases involving major violations with actual
or high-potential for harming public health or the
environment, and all cases involving a history of
repeat violations by the same violator will require a
penalty as a part of any settlement, unless good
cause is shown for not lenlring a penalty.

the Executive Secretary will consider the factors
listed in Section R3U-208-5.
1992
19-6-106,19-6
RS11-209. State Cleanup Appropriation*
R311-20S-1. Definitions.
R311-209-2. Use of the State Cleanup Appropriation.
R3U-20S-3. Criteria lor Allocating State Cleanup Appropriation*.

RSU-909-1. Definitions*
Definitions are found in Section R311-200.
R81M09-2. Use of the State Cleanup Appropriation.
The Executive Secretary shall authorise action or
expenditure of money from the State Cleanup Appropriation, as authorised by Subsection 19-6409(5), when:
(a) The release isfroma regulated UST,
(b) The owner or operator is not covered by the
Petroleum Storage Tank Fund,
(c) The release is a direct or potential threat to
human health or the environment, and
(d) The owner or operator is unknown, unable, or
RS11-908-& Penalty Classification.
unwilling to bring the site under control or
(a) Where the Executive Secretary determines remediate the site to achieve the clean-up goals as
that a penalty is appropriate, the penalty will be described in Section R3U-2U, or
based on the following categories and ranges consis(e) Other relevant factors are evident as detertent with "EPA Penalty Guidance for Violations of mined by the Executive Secretary.
UST Regulations" (OSWER Directive 9610.12):
(1) Major Violations: $5,000 to $10,000 per viola- R8U-909-3. Criteria for Allocating State
Cleanup Appropriations.
tion. This category includes:
When determining priorities for authorizing ac(A) Deviationfromthe requirements of the rules
or Act to such an extent that there is substantial tion or expenditures from the Petroleum Storage
Tank Fund surplus, the Executive Secretary shall
noncompliance;
(B) A violation that causes or may cause substan- give due emphasis to releases that present a threat
tial or continuing risk to human health and the to the public health or the environment on a case-by
ease basis using thefollowingcriteria:
environment; or
The immediate or direct threat to public health
(C) A violation that may have a substantial ad- or(a)
the environment,
verse effect on the regulatory program.
(b) The potential threat to public health or the
(2) Moderate Violations: $2,000 to $7,000 per environment,
violation. This category includes:
(c) The economic consideration and cost effective(A) Deviationfromtic requirements of the rules ness of the action, and
or Act but to some extent the requirements have
(d) The technology available, or
been implemented as intended;
(e) Other relevantfiactorsas determined by the
(B) A violation that causes or may cause a signifi- Executive Secretary.
cant risk to human health and the environment; or 1994
19-6-106,19-6-409
(C) A violation that may have a significant adverse
effect on the regulatory program.
(3) Minor Violations: Up to $3,000 per violation. R311-210. Administrative Procedures for
Underground Storage Tank Act AdjudiThis category includes:
(A) Slight deviationfromthe rules or Act but most cative Proceedings.
of the requirements are met;
(B) A violation that causes or may cause a rela- R3U-210-1. Definition!.
RS11-210-2. General Provisions.
tively low risk to human health and the environ- 8311-210^3.
Orders, NOVs, and Other Decisions by the
ment; or
Kienitits Secret aj >.
(C) A violation that may have a minor adverse R311-210-4. Cantestinf the Validity of Initial Orders and
effect on the regulatory program.
Notices of Violation Issued by the Executive Secretary.
(b) The Executive Secretary shall have the discre- BS11-210-6. Parties and Intervention.
tion to determine the appropriate penalty within R3U-210-6. Presiduaf Officer or Other Adjudicator.
these ranges. In setting the amount of the penalty, B3U-210-7. Dasignstion of Formal Proceedingi.
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BSU-Slft-S

R311-21M. Cosranfee i/rmwiilirni
L A perty ia known to be repreatnted by en
B811-210-9 Preiau&sjy Mattan to A|i|i«H«Bnf and attorney et the time the attorney filet s notice of
Other Proossdinfs.
appoaranot of counsel, rsquestforegency action, or
R311-210-10. Muhipk Icsoss er Perbae.
any other paper which the attorney eigne on behalf
1311-210-U. Ifotions.
of a party.
R8U-210-12. Rseard ft»w-i-r~ a d Rsvisw.
2. Issuance of an order or notiot of violation to an
BS12-210-18. Diseovsry.
13X1.210-14. P»-Hasru«Mstttrs.
attorney or nnropiooontori perty shall bt made by
E311.210-I5. Conduct of Formal Hssriags.
certified mail to the attorney or party*! most current
E311-21G-16. Roles of Evidence.
address listed on papers filed by tht attorney or
R811-210.17. Bernm mended Ordsrs.
unreproccDtod
party. If delivery of certified mail is
1311-210.10. Stsysef Ordsrs.
refused, the ieeued order or notice shall than bt sent
by regular mailing.
E3U-210-L Definition*
S. Other eervict upon en attorney or unrepreDsflnitians artfoundm Section R311-200.
sented pasty ahall be made by mailing tht docuaaontt to the attorney or party's most current adBSU-SIO-S. General Provisions
(a) In accordance with the Utah Administrative toss, at listed on papers filed by the attorney or
Ptooeduree Act (UAPA), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 perty. If no eddreai is known, tht donrmsntt shall
at amended, Section 63-46b-l at ocq., thaaa rulet act bt left with tht presiding officer. In requests for
ferth prooeduret which govern ijqdtial ordan and agency action, the presiding officer may require
notices of Tiolation by tht Executive Secretary. Such adrfttifinal efforts in determining e current address,
initial orders and notioaa of violation era not gov- or publication.
(g) Psrtiet that request e determination of reeponerned by tht UAPA at provided in Subsection 6346b-l(2Xk). Heat rulet alec govern adjudicative ofblt parties or apportioning of liability among reprooaedingi before the Board, eoneomiag agency sponsible perties shell pey the eostt erf the initial
action* directed or addraaaad by tht Underground notion, and any proceedingsfollowings contest of en
initial action at a rate ast by tht state legislsture.
Storage Tank Act.
(b) Recognizing tht potential far an ever incraee- Bowsver, when e final determination of liability is
ing burdenfromadjudicating a natter, theet rulet mads and tht requesting perty is lest than ant
a n to facilitate and encourage that dieputae bt hundred per cent habit, tht costs of tht proceedings
ahall bt included in the apportionment decision end
raeolved at tht loweet level poeeible.
(c) Theet rulet art not intended to bt oomprahen- the requesting perty mey rsoover its costs from tht
aive, but, art far supplementation^ and provide far ether partiet aooording to each party's apportioned
tht inherent needt and unique pmrposat of prooocd- liability. If tht agency mitistst such proceedings
inga directed or addreaaed by the Underground without s requesting perty, the egency shell pey tht
eostt of the proceedings end may recover eoctt of tht
Storage Tank Act.
(d) Theet rulet ahall be Kbenilly eonetrued to proceedings as provided abovs.
eecura a just, apeedy and economical determination
(h) Except as otharwies stated m Section R311of all iaeuet prat anted. Theet rulet ahall alao bt S10, informal adjudicative proceedings shall bt conoonftrued to bt in eomphanet witii the UAPA at far ducted in eocordanet with Section 6&46b-5.
at tht UAPA it applicable, tht Environmental Qual6) A contested initial order involving the revocaity Codt (Section 19-1 et eeq.) and the Underground tion of certificates of i*wwtPtiffTK^ is, in aeoordanot
Storage Tknk Act Whenever indicated, certain pro- with Bubeection l»-$-4H(8), before tht Executive
vision! have exclusive application to either UAPA Director. In such contested orders the term 'Board*
exempt,formal,or informal prooeedinga.
as used in R311-210 means the Executive Director.
(e) Individuals who art partidpantt to e proceed(j) The tenn •issue* es in issuing an order means
ing, en agency which it a participant to a proceed- the time e signed order is mailed by certified maiL
ing, or an individual designated by e partnership,
(k) TSme shall bt computed at provided in Bule 6
corporation, association or governmental oubdivi- ef the Utah Rulet of Civil Procedure.
eicm may represent their interest in tht pinrsoiling.
0) At the time theee rules become effective, they
Any participant may be represented by an attorney will apply to ongoing adjudicative proceedings.
licensed to practice in tht State of 'Utah or attorneys
licensed to practice law in another jurisdiction B3U-I10-*. Order*, NOVs, and Other Dadwhich meet tht rules of the Utah State Bar far
otons by the Executive Secretary.
practicing law before tht courts of the 8tate of Utah.
(a) Proceedings that culminate in the issuanot of
(f) Whenever a party is known to bt rspreesnted u UtisJ order or e notiot of violation art not
by en ettomey, any iasuanes of an order or notiot of governed by tht provisions of ths UAPA at specified
violation, or service required or permitted by theet in Bubeection 88-48b-l(2Xk).
rulet or UAPA shall bt made upon tht attorney
<b) The initial ordan and notices descrihsd in ths
instead of upon tht party itsslt ]En matters where m t ^ | subsection (a) ahall be ieeued by the
tht Executive Secretary is a participant, eervict Executive Secretary.
shell be made to tht Executive Secretary and attor(c) Orders and notioss of violation may be ieeued
&oy repreeenting tht Executive Sserstary.
by ths Executive Secretary after investigation of the
January 1,1965
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matter which may at the Executive Secretary's discretion include only review of the agency file.
(d) All initial orders or notices of violation are
effective upon issuance and shall becomefinalif not
contested within 30 days after the date issued
Failure totimelycontest an initial order or notice of
violation waives any right of administrative contest,
reconsideration, review or judicial appeal The contesting party has the burden of proving that an
investigative order or notice of violation was contested within 30 days of its issuance.
(e) A party may seek to have the Executive Secretary set aside an initial order or notice of violation
which was not contested within 30 days and became
final by following the procedures outlined in the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for setting aside
default judgments.
1. Amotion to set aside an initial order or notice of
violation that became final shall be made to the
Executive Secretary.
2. If a motion to set aside an initial order or notice
of violation that became final is denied, the party
may seek reconsideration or agency review of only
that decision to deny such motion to set aside the
order or notice.
3. In proceedings involving multiple parties, a
party that has an initial order issued against it
which becomesfinal,is precluded from participating
in any further adjudicative proceedings with the
other parties on the matter.
(f) All initial orders and notices of violation issued
by the Executive Secretary shall be listed in a log
that is available for public inspection during office
hours.
R311-210-4. Contesting the Validity of Initial
Orders and Notices of Violation Issued by
the Executive Secretary.
(a) The validity of initial orders or notices of
violation may be contested by filing a request for
agency action, as specified in Section 63-46b-3 of the
UAPA, with the Board: Solid and Hazardous Waste
Control Board; Division of Environmental Response
and Remediation; 168 North 1950 West, 1st Floor,
PO Box 144840; Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-4840; or
when contesting an initial order revoking a certificate of compliance, by filing such request with the
Executive Director of the Department of Environmental Quality: Department of Environmental
Quality, Office of the Executive Director, 168 North
1950 West, 2nd Floor; PO Box 144810; Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114-4810.
(b) Any such request must be received for filing
within thirty (30) days of the date the Executive
Secretary issues the order or notice of violation.
(c) A request for agency action and all subsequent
proceedings acting on that request are governed by
the UAPA as provided in Subsection 63-46b-l(2Xk).
(d) Notice of the time and place of any scheduled
hearing shall be provided in the response to a
request for agency action. If a hearing has not been
scheduled, the response shall give notice of the time
and place of a pre-hearing conference to appropri22

ately schedule a hearing. Notice of the time and
place of a hearing shall be provided promptly after
the hearing is scheduled.
R311-210-5. Parties and Intervention*
(a) The following persons are parties to a proceeding governed by this rule:
1. The person or persons to whom the challenged
order or notice of violation is directed;
2. The Executive Secretary; and
3. All persons whose legal rights or interests are
substantially affected by the proceeding, and to
whom intervention rights have been granted under
R311-210-5(d).
(b) In a proceeding requested by the person to
whom the challenged order or notice of violation is
directed, that person shall be the petitioner and the
Executive Secretary or any other non-requesting
parties shall be the respondent.
(c) In a proceeding requested by the person requesting intervention, the intervenor shall be the
petitioner (provided that intervention is granted),
and the Executive Secretary and any persons to
whom the challenged order or notice of violation is
directed shall be the respondents.
(d) Intervention: A person who is not a party to a
proceeding may request intervention under Section
63-46b-9 of the UAPA for the purpose of filing a
request for agency action, and may simultaneously
file that request Any such request for intervention
and agency action must be received by the Board for
filing as provided in R311-210-4 within 30 days of
the date of the pertinent order or notice of violation.
The person seeking intervention shall provide copies
of the request and any accompanying motions, notices, and requests to all parties.
(e) Any party may, within 20 days or such earlier
time as established by the presiding officer, respond
to a request for intervention. If no presiding officer
with a general appointment exists, the Chair of the
Board may act as presiding officer for purposes of
this paragraph.
(f) Persons may be permitted by the presiding
officer to enter an appearance as Amicus Curiae,
subject to conditions established by the presiding
officer.
R311-210-6. Presiding Officer or Other Adjudicator.
(a) The Board is the 'agency head" as the term is
used in the UAPA. The Board is also the "presiding
officer,* as that term is used in the UAPA, except:
1. the Chair of the Board shall be considered the
presiding officer to the extent that these rules allow;
and
2. the Board may by order appoint a presiding
officer to preside over all or a portion of the proceedings.
(b) A presiding officer appointed by the Board shall
be empowered with such authority as granted by the
Board and the UAPA, except making final substantive decisions and as may be limited by Section
R311-210 or the appointing authority.
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RS11-210-7. Designation of Formal Proceedings.
Proceedings pursuant to a request for agency
action before the Board are designated as formal,
including: proceedings to determine responsible parties and apportion liability among responsible parties, enforcement, violations, non-compliance, civil
penalties, assessments, revocations, lapsed or terminated certificates, abatements, corrective plans, releases, tank tightness, claims, and other matters
determining a person's legal interest.
R31I-210-8. Conversion of Proceedings.
(a) The Board, or in accordance with the UAPA,
the presiding officer, may, at any time, convert
proceedings which are designated informal to formal, and proceedings which are designated as formal to informal if conversion is in the public interest
and rights of all parties are not unfairly prejudiced.
(b) If multiple issues are part of one proceeding,
the presiding officer may separate the proceedings to
convert one or more of the mattersfromformalto
informal or informal toformalwhile allowing the
other matters to proceed at the ongoing designation.
R311-210-9. Preliminary Matters to Apportionment and Other Proceedings.
(a) The Executive Secretary may request owners
or operators of a facility that had a release of a
regulated substance or any persons identified as
potential responsible parties to provide information
and documentation pertinent to the identincation of
other responsible parties. However, this does not
prevent the Executive Secretary from determining
responsible parties and apportioning liability. If information identifying or otherwise concerning other
potentially responsible parties is provided, the forwarding of such information to the Executive Secretary is not to be construed as a request to determine
responsible parties or apportion liability.
(b) The Executive Secretary may mai:e a preliminary identification of as many responsible parties as
reasonably possible that are to be a part of an initial
proceeding. The preliminary identification of responsible parties does not constitute an initial order
or notice of violation. The preliminary identification
may be made solely from information provided in
the manner described in subsection R311-210-9(a).
In making such a determination, the Executive
Secretary may assess whether any identification of a
responsible party by other parties is without merit,
or may find that no grounds exist to identify such
person as a responsible party.
(c) Before any initial proceeding is commenced,
the Executive Secretary, or a representative of the
Executive Secretary may seek to resolve the impending proceeding by encouraging en- facilitating
settlement.
R311-210-10. Multiple Issues or Parties.
(a) Multiple issues may be determined in one
proceeding, or in one resulting order or notice of
violation.
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(b) Proceedings to determine multiple issues in
one initial agency action may if contested, proceed
separately, either as informal, or formal proceedings.
(c) The naming or identifying of responsible parties as part of an investigation whether or not it
results in an initial order or notice of violation, or as
part of an abjudication does not preclude the naming
or identifying of different or additional responsible
parties in the same investigation or adjudication for
different issues, or separate investigations or adjudications concerning different issues.
RS11-210-11- Motions.
(a) In an informal proceeding, a motion or response to a motion may be submitted orally or in
writing as directed by the presiding officer.
(b) In aformalproceeding, any motion or response
to a motion shall be submitted in writing to the
presiding officer, unless otherwise directed by the
presiding officer. The motion or response may be
accompanied by a short supporting memorandum of
fact and law. Supporting or contravening affidavits
may be submitted with the motion or response.
(c) Responses to motions must be received by the
presiding officer ten days after the motion is submitted, unless otherwise directed by the presiding officer.
(d) Although the agency or parties may file responses as provided in R311-210-ll(c), such responses are not required and the agency or parties
will not be subject to default for declining to file
responses.
(e) Dispositive motions that concern facts or matters beyond those contained solely within the request for agency action shall be completed 30 days
before the scheduled hearing, unless otherwise directed by the presiding officer.
R811-210-12- Record Submission and Review.
In accordance with Subsection 63-46b-5(e), in informal proceedings the presiding officer may require
parties to submit pertinent information within a
designated response period. Parties' access to information shall be as provided in the UAPA. The
presiding officer may sanction a party that does not
submit information that is requested by the presiding officer. Such sanctions include exclusion of evidence at the hearing, being held in default, or other
applicable sanctions found in Rule 37(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. If a hearing is scheduled, a
party shall submit to the presiding officer any information that was not requested that the party intends to use at the hearing 30 days before the
hearing. Failure to timely submit such information
may result in the presiding officer excluding the
information at the hearing.
RS11-210-1S. Disoovery.
(a) Informalproceedings, all parties shall submit
to the presiding officer all relevant information they
possess or are aware of necessary for parties to
support their claims or defenses within 30 days after
proceedings are commenced, and with newly ac-
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quired information within 30 days after the party
discovers such information, but not less than 30
days before a formal hearing. The Executive Secretary satisfies this obligation by maVrng the public
agency file available for inspection. If a party foils to
timely provide the required information, the presiding officer may enter an order of default, exclude
evidence, or enter other applicable sanctions found
in Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Parties submitting the information shall provide
notice to all other parties with a list or brief summary of all information being submitted. Parties
shall have access to the information submitted to
the presiding officer, and to information acquired
through agency investigations and other information contained in its files.
(b) In formal proceedings the presiding officer may
vary the manner of discovery if it appears appropriate, or upon the motion of a party and for good cause
shown. If discovery is varied to be more in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, copies
of all discovery conducted between parties shall be
provided to the presiding officer at the cost to the
party seeking discovery.
(c) In formal proceedings, upon approval by the
presiding officer, any party may serve on any other
party a request to permit entry upon designated
land or other property in the possession or control of
the party upon whom the request is served for the
purpose of inspection and measuring, surveying,
photographing, testing, or sampling the property or
any designated object or operation thereon if the
information sought is reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence.
1. The request shall set forth the items to be
inspected either by individual item or by category,
and describe each item and category with reasonable particularity. The request shall specify a reasonable time, place, and manner of making the
inspection and performing the related acts.
2. The party upon whom the request is served
shall serve a written response within 20 days after
the service of the request. The presiding officer may
allow a shorter or longer time. The response shall
state with respect to each item or category, that
inspection and related activities will be permitted as
requested, unless the request is objected to, in which
event the reasons for objection shall be stated. The
party submitting the request may move for an order
compelling inspection and seek any sanction referred to above in subsection (a) with respect to any
objection to or failure to respond to the request or
any part thereof, or any failure to permit inspection
as requested.

unnecessary proof; arranging for the exchange of
proposed exhibits or prepared expert testimony;
identifying all other proposed exhibits or witnesses;
outlining or reviewing procedures to be followed;
encouraging joint pleadings, exhibits, testimony and
cross-examination where parties have common interests; and facilitating settlement and other agreements. Any other matters that may expedite the
orderly conduct of the proceedings may be discussed.
(b) Parties to a proceeding are encouraged to
prepare a joint proposed schedule addressing matters such as a hearing date, and motion and discovery cut off dates. If the parties cannot agree on a
joint proposed schedule, the presiding officer may
consider proposals by any party.
(c) The presiding officer shall establish schedules
for discovery and other pre-hearing proceedings, for
the heaxing, and for any post-hearing proceedings.

R311-210-15. Conduct of Formal Hearings.
(a) All formal hearings shall be open to the public,
unless otherwise ordered by the presiding officer for
good cause shown.
(b) The presiding officer shall maintain order and
may, recess the hearing for the time necessary to
regain order if a person engages in disrespectful,
disorderly, or contumacious conduct. The presiding
officer may take measures to remove a person,
including participants from the hearing, if necessary, to maintain order. If a participant shows persistent disregard on matters of order and procedure,
the presiding officer may enter a sanction on the
person including: restricting the person's participation, putting on evidence, or issuing an order of
default.
(c) If a party desires to employ a court reporter to
make a record of the hearing, the original transcript
of the hearing shall be filed with the presiding officer
at no cost to the agency.
(d) In apportionment proceedings, the order of
presentation of evidence will be as follows, unless
otherwise directed by the presiding officer the responsible party most recently involved in the facility,
with operators having priority over owners; then
underground storage tank installation companies,
then subsequent responsible parties in the order of
recency of involvement in the facility; intervenor(s);
the agency, and other interested parties. Argument
normally will follow the same order. For other proceedings, the presiding officer may order the presentation of evidence in a manner deemed appropriate.
(e) Parties may question opposing witnesses on
any matter relevant to the issue even though the
matter was not covered in direct examination. The
presiding officer may limit or exclude friendly crossR311-210-14. Pre-Hearing Matters.
examination. The presiding officer shall discourage
(a) In proceedings in which a hearing may be held, and may prohibit parties from making their case
the presiding officer may, upon written notice to all through cross-examination.
parties of record, hold a pre-hearing conference.
(f) The presiding officer may question any party or
Matters that may be discussed at the pre-hearing witness and may admit any evidence believed relconference include: setting a hearing date; formulat- evant or material.
ing or simplifying the issues; obtaining stipulations,
(g) The presiding officer may continue a hearing to
admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid another time or place if additional evidence is avail24
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able or reasonably expected to be available and the
presiding officer determines such evidence is necessary for the proper determination of the case.
R311-210-16. Rule* of Evidence.
(a) The presiding officer is not bound by the rules
of evidence and need not adhere to the rules as
required in civil actions in the courts of this State.
Nevertheless, in proceedings contesting an initial
order or notice of violation, the Utah Rules of Evidence shall be used as an appropriate guide insofar
as they are not inconsistent with the UAPA and
these Rules.
(b) In contested proceedings providing a hearing,
if a witness' testimony has been reduced to writing
andfiledwith the presiding officer at least 30 days
prior to the hearing, the testimony may be placed
into the record as an exhibit. Parties shall have an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness on the
testimony.
R311-210-17. Recommended Orders.
(a) If the presiding officer in a proceeding is an
appointed presiding officer, at the conclusion of the
hearing or taking evidence, the presiding officer
cannot make any final substantive decisions, but,
shall take the matter under advisement and shall
submit to the Board recommended orders. The recommended orders shall follow the form in the UAPA
for signed and issued orders in informal or formal
proceedings. All recommended orders will be public
record and copies shall be distributed to all parties.
(b) Any party may, within 20 days of the date the
draft order is mailed, delivered, or published, comment on the draft order.
(c) The Board may adopt and sign the recommended orders or any portion of them as final
orders; reject the recommended orders or any portion of them and make an independent determination based on the record or order further proceedings. If the Board adopts or rejects a portion of the
recommended orders, the Board shall make specific
reference to the portion adopted or rejected. If the
Board rejects the entire recommended orders, the
Board shall specifically state that they are rejected
in their entirety. The Board shall cite specifically to
the record for the bases of any independent determinations in thefinalorders.
(d) The Board may remand the matter to the
presiding officer to take additional evidence. The
presiding officer thereafter shall submit to the Board
new recommended orders.
(e) The Board adopting and signing recommended
orders asfinalorders or making independent determinations and signing them asfinalorders pursuant
to a request for agency action to contest an initial
order does not constitute agency review, but is open
to a request for reconsideration in accordance with
Section 63-46b-13 of the UAPA.

BSU-211-8

person who desires a stay of the order before the
next regular board meeting may request a stay.
(b) A party seeking a stay of the order of the
Executive Secretary shall file a motion with the
presiding officer.
(c) The presiding officer may order a stay of the
order of the Executive Secretary if the party seeking
the stay demonstrates that:
1. The party seeking the stay will suffer irreparable harm unless the stay issues;
2. The threatened injury to the party seeking the
stay outweighs whatever damage the proposed stay
is likely to cause the party restrained or enjoined;
3. The stay, if issued, would not be adverse to the
public interest; and
4. There is a substantial likelihood that the party
enrlrirtg the stay will prevail on the merits of the
underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues
on the merits which should be the subject of further
evaluation by the presiding officer.
(d) No bond shall be required from the party
requesting the stay.
(e) The Board may grant a stay of its order (or of
the order of its appointed presiding officer) during
the pendency of judicial review if the standards of
R311-210-18(c) are met.
(f) The request for a stay shall be deemed denied
if the presiding officer does not issue a written
decision to deny or grant a stay of any order within
ten working days of thefilingof a written motion.
1994
194-105, 19-6-408
R311-211. Corrective Action Clean-up
Standards Policy — UST and CERCLA
Sites.
R311-21M. Definitions.
R311-211-2. Source Elimination.
K311-211-3. Clean-up Standards Evaluation Criteria.
R311-2U-4. Prevention of Further Degradation.
R311-211-5. Clean-up Standards.
R311-211-6. Significance Level.
R311-211-7. Interim Policy.
R311-211-1. Definitions.
Definitions are found in Section R311-200.
R311-211-2. Source Elimination,
The initial step in all corrective actions implemented at UST and CERCLA sites is to take appropriate action to eliminate the source of contamination either through removal, or appropriate aource
control.

R311-211-S. Clean-up Standards Evaluation
Criteria.
Subsequent to aource elimination, clean-up standards for remaining contamination which may inR311-210-1& Stays of Orders.
clude numerical, technology-based or risk-based
(a) Orders of the Executive Secretary are immedi- standards or any combination of those standards,
ately effective upon being issued. Upon a timely shall be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking
requestforagency action to contest such orders, any into consideration thefollowingcriteria:
January 1,1995
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial
f{ 11 to 14, 29 et teq., 187 to 191.
C.J.S. — 66 C J.S. New Trial i§ 13 et seq.,
116/116, 122 to 127.
AJLR. — Content aa ground of vacating
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil caee,
after expiration of term or time prescribed by
statute or rules of court, 3 AXJELSd 1191.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
or comments by judge as to compromise or settlement of civil case, 6 AJLRSd 1467.
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
in oppositiontojBJ°ti<mfornew trial in civil
case, 7 AXJtSd 1000.
Quotient verdicts, 8 AJ-^Sd 335.
J X & ^ ^ r t ^ £ * * t ^ L
turns in civil case as affected by the manner in
which they are written, 10 AXJLSd 601.
Prejudicial affect of unauthorized view by
jury mdvil case of scene of accident or pmnises in question, 11 AiJLSd 918.
Propriety and injudicial effect of r^eronce
by counsel in civil case toresultofformertrial
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 16
AXJt3d 1101.
Absence ofjudgefromcourtroom during trial
of civil case, 26 A.LJt3d 637.
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of such attornay, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
AJLIUd 126.

Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in dvil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.ItSd 845.
Authority of atate court to order jury trial in
civil caee where jury hae been waived or not
ii>m«n^ by parties, 9 AXIUth 1041.
Deafness of juror as ground for impflnrhing
verdict, or em in \ng new trial or reversal on
appeal, 38 AJLR.4th 1170.
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state
^ AXIUth 747.
d v i j trisli
^ ^ rWgmto>% death or disability prior to
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or
new trial, 67 AXJL4th 1049.
Propriety of K™i*i*g to issue of damages
alone new trial g r a ^ cm gnmnd of inade.
_.__ ^ Ammmm-u ~~*~~~ ~—• u i P K^
g £ * c/damages
-modern cases, 5 AXJLSth
„'
,
.
^ * « • « OT *??*<*<'of compensatory
damagesforpersonal injury to or death of sea**an ** actions under Jones Act (46 USCS
Appx.l 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness —
modern cases, 96 AX.R. Fed. 641.
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam•£©* for personal injury or death in actions under Federal Employers' Liability Act (46 USCS
f ( 61 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.LH. Fed.
189.
Key Numbers. — New Trial •» 13 et seq.,
no, 116.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arisingfromoversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representativefroma
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (8)fraud(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
<4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relieffromthe operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect thefinalityof a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a partyfroma judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment forfraudupon the court. The procedure for
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obtaining any relieffroma judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule if similar to
Rule 60, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

"Any other reason justifying relief."
—Default judgment.
—Impossibility of compliance with order.
—Incompetent counsel.
—Lack of due process.
—Merits of case.
—Mistake or inadvertence.
—Mutual mistake.
—Real party in interest.
—Refund of fine after riismisssl.
Appeals.
Clerical mistakes.
—Computation of damages.
—Correction after appeal.
—Date of judgment.
-—Void judgment.
—Estate record.
—Inherent power of courts.
—Intent of court and parties.
—Judicial error distinguished.
—Order prepared by counsel.
—Predating of new trial motion.
Court's discretion.
Default judgment.
Effect of set-aside judgment.
—Admissions.
Form of motion.
Fraud.
—Burden of proof.
—Divorce action.
Independent action.
—Constitutionality of taxes.
—Divorce decree.
—Fraud or duress.
—Motion distinguished.
Invalid summons.
—Amendment without notice.
Inequity of prospective application.
Jurisdiction.
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect.
—Default judgment
Illness.
Inconvenience.
Meritorious.
— M e r i t s of claim.
-—Negligence of attorney.
No claim for relief.
-—Delayed motion for new trial.
—Factual error.
—Failure to file cost bill.
—Failure to file notice of appeal.
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings.
—Trial court's discretion.
—Unemployment compensation appeal.
—Workmen's compensation appeal.
Newly discovered evidence.
—Burden of proof.
—Discretion not abused.
Procedure.
—Notice to parties.
Res judicata.

Reversal of judgment.
—Invalidation of sale.
Satisfaction, release or discharge.
—Accord and satisfaction.
—Discharging representative of estate from
farther demand.
—Erroneously included damages.
—Prospective application of judgment.
Timeliness of motion.
—Confused mental condition of party.
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution.
—Fraud.
—Invalid service.
—Judicial error.
—Jurisdiction.
—Mistake, inadvertence and neglect.
—Newly discovered evidence.
—Order entered upon erroneous assumption.
—•Reasonable time."
—Reconsideration of previously denied motion.
—Satisfaction.
Unauthorized appearance.
Void judgment.
—Basis.
—Lack of jurisdiction.
Cited.
"Any other reason justifying relief."
Subdivision (7) embodies three requirements: First, that the reason be one other than
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6); second, that the reason justify relief; and third,
that the motion be made within a reasonable
time. Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. AaVn, 657
P.2d 1804 (Utah 1982); Richins v. Delbert
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 882 (Utah Ct App.
1991).
Where a defendant's motion to set aside
judgment based on Subdivisions (bXD and (7)
and his motion for a new trial claimed that
plaintiff violated Rule 5(a) on several occasions
by not providing defendant with a copy of
pleadings, thereby causing surprise, centering
on plaintiffs failure to provide a copy of his
motion for summary judgment to defendant,
which the latter claimed was a clear showing
offraudon plaintiffs part, the trial court could
have believed in denying defendant's motion,
that fraud was not present in what could be
considered s lapse in procedure by plaintiffs
counsel. Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1872
(Utah Ct App. 1987).
Defendant's claim that he mistakenly entered into an ill-advised stipulation without
fully understanding its consequences was correctly characterised by trial court as mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or neglect under Subdivision (b)(1); because Subdivision (bXD applied, Subdivision (b)(7) could not apply and
could not be used to circumvent the threemonth filing period. Richins v. Delbert
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 882 (Utah Ct App.
1991).

